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This paper, in the spirit of intellectual history, draws together as many as possible of the clues 
and pieces of the puzzle surrounding T.S. Eliot’s “infamous” literary term “objective 
correlative.”1 Many different scholars have claimed many different sources for the term, in 
Pound, Whitman, Baudelaire, Washington Allston, Santayana, Husserl, Nietzsche, Newman, 
Walter Pater, Coleridge, Russell, Bradley, Bergson, Bosanquet, Schopenhauer and Arnold.2  
This piece will rewrite this list by surveying those individuals who, in different ways, either 
offer the truest claim to being the source of the term, or contributed the most to Eliot’s 
development of it: Allston, Husserl, Bradley, and Bergson. On the way, some of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the term will be discussed. What this survey shows, with fresh clarity, is 
that a single direct source for the term “objective correlative” is not to be found. Rather, it 
was born out of a trans-Atlantic philosophical conversation about the nature of objects, a 
                                                 
1 The term is “infamous” because it is indelibly associated with “one of the most critical documents of the 20th 
century” namely “Hamlet and His Problems.” Eliot takes “the opportunity to pontificate on finding a serious 
flaw in one of the world’s greatest tragic plays, and he not only gets away with it but enhances his own 
reputation and credentials as a critical intellect in the process” see Murphy, Critical Companion to T.S. Eliot, 
163, 247. For examples where the term is described as “infamous” see Wood, “The Struggles of T.S. Eliot;” 
Hartman, Free Verse, 133; Sayeau, Against the Event, 211. 
2 While this paper aims to be as exhaustive and comprehensible as possible in its examination of the major 
influences and sources of Eliot’s “objective correlative,” some of the minor and less significant figures will not 
be mentioned. Many can be sourced by consulting Frank’s “T.S. Eliot’s Objective Correlative and the 
Philosophy of F.H. Bradley,” 317, note 1. For John Henry Newman see Cowley, “A Source for T.S. Eliot’s 
‘Objective Correlative’.” For Nietzsche see Lees, “T. S. Eliot and Nietzsche.” For Walter Pater see DeLaura, 
“Pater and Eliot: the Origin of the ‘Objective Correlative’.” For Santayana see McElderry, “Santayana and 
Eliot's' Objective Correlative.” For Coleridge consult Di Pasquale, “Coleridge’s Framework of Objectivity and 
Eliot’s Objective Correlative.” For Schopenhauer see Virkar-Yates, “An Objective Chemistry: What T.S. Eliot 
borrowed from Schopenhauer.” Further to this see also editorial note 15 for “Hamlet” in Eliot, The Complete 
Prose of T.S. Eliot: The Critical Edition, Volume 2, 128, note 15.  
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conversation with which Eliot was well acquainted. It was from this philosophical familiarity 
that he drew in forming his own aesthetic, literary ideas of criticism.  While there are surface 
similarities evident in the various potential influences on Eliot’s term these can disguise what 
are, in fact, pronounced differences in the idealist and phenomenological approaches to 
understanding the nature of objects. As the paper will show Eliot’s “objective correlative” is 
indebted more to the idealist tradition, and Bergson’s influence, than to the complexities of 
Husserlian phenomenology.         
  Frank Kermode, in his masterful introduction to the Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot (1975), 
describes the term “objective correlative” as a phrase that suffers from “imperfect 
articulation,” theorized in one of Eliot’s “least impressive essays.”3 The essay in question is 
“Hamlet and His Problems,” which was written in 1919 and republished in a collection of 
Eliot’s essays titled The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry & Criticism (1920).4 In the essay 
Eliot writes: “The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 
‘objective correlative’; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which 
shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must 
terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.”5  
  Eliot develops the term to criticize Hamlet, which he considered a failure because 
Shakespeare did not provide enough content in the play to generate the horror in the audience 
that Hamlet, the character, experiences in himself. “Hamlet,” Eliot writes, “is full of some 
stuff that the writer could not drag to light, contemplate, or manipulate into art. And when we 
                                                 
3 Kermode, Introduction, 16.  
4 Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 100. “Hamlet and His Problems” first appeared in the Athenaeum, 940-1, see Gallup, 
T.S. Eliot, 84. 
5 Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 92. 
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search for this feeling, we find it . . . very difficult to localize.”6 In other words, Hamlet is a 
failure because it lacks an objective correlative. Eliot writes that “Hamlet (the man) is 
dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in excess of the facts as they 
appear.”7 Eliot locates this excess of emotion in Hamlet’s reaction to his mother Gertrude. 
Hamlet is disgusted by her but his disgust envelopes and exceeds her as a character. It is thus 
a feeling Hamlet cannot understand, and so neither can we the audience. The problem, Eliot 
contends, is that Gertrude is not an adequate equivalent to represent this disgust. Furthermore 
there is nothing in the play that Shakespeare can do to express this reaction. Eliot points out 
that in successful tragedies you find this “exact equivalence,” for example 
 
. . . you will find that the state of mind of Lady Macbeth walking in her sleep has been 
communicated to you by a skilful accumulation of imagined sensory impressions; the words of 
Macbeth on hearing of his wife’s death strike us as if, given the sequence of events, these words 
were automatically released by the last event in the series. The artistic “inevitability” lies in this 
complete adequacy of the external to the emotion; and this is precisely what is deficient in 
Hamlet.8 
   
  This criticism of Hamlet has struck many readers as odd. In the words of Bradley 
Greenberg, Eliot produced in his version of the objective correlative a “conceptual 
formulation that has proved difficult and often unwieldy for criticism.”9 Kermode, as we 
know, describes it as an idea imperfectly articulated, and, as another critic notes, it “collapses 
                                                 
6 Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 91. 
7 Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 92. 
8 Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 92. 
9 Greenburg, “T.S. Eliot’s Impudence: Hamlet, Objective Correlative, and Formulation,” 217.   
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very quickly under analysis.”10 Certainly Eliot, a young and promising man of letters (he was 
32 when The Sacred Wood, his first volume of criticism, was published) wanted to generate 
some controversy by criticizing what many would call one of the greatest artworks in 
existence. Later in life Eliot admitted as much, stating in his lecture ‘To Criticize the Critic,’ 
delivered in 1961, that in his Hamlet essay he was not “altogether guiltless of trailing my 
coat: I was at the time hand-in-glove with that gallant controversialist, J.M. Robertson.”11 He 
adds, presciently, that if his phrases are “given consideration in a century hence, it will be 
only in their historical context.”12 While we might charitably argue that the term “objective 
correlative” had some merit before it was surpassed by more sophisticated literary theories 
that appeared subsequently, Eliot’s application of it to Hamlet to explain why the play is a 
failure is hardly convincing. Nonetheless, his dramatic examples go some way towards 
demonstrating the meaning of “objective correlative”: essentially, a great artwork should both 
convey and elicit the necessary emotional response from the viewer. However the term in this 
literary sense is far more “impressionistic” than “rigorous.”13  
 Aside, then, from what one of the 20th century’s greatest  poets actually meant in this 
important and somewhat puzzling essay, what is and remains a question is where the term 
originates. Did Eliot really create the term himself ex nihilo? Or are there other thinkers 
whose use of the term preceded and possibly inspired Eliot’s own? This essay aims re-
investigate the issue by discussing the different individuals who have developed a term 
similar to Eliot’s and whose ideas Eliot encountered. 
 
                                                 
10 Eliot, Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, 16; Menand, “T.S. Eliot,” 20.  
11 Eliot, To Criticize the Critic and Other Writings, 19. 
12 Eliot, To Criticize the Critic and Other Writings, 19. 
13 “Objective Correlative,” The Literary Encyclopaedia. 
6 
 
 
 
I. 
The first clue to the original source of the term is given by Eliot himself, with a tone of mild 
incredulity, in his 1956 preface to Essays on Elizabethan Drama,14 a reprinting of works from 
his earlier volumes, including The Sacred Wood, Selected Essays (1932) and Elizabethan 
Essays (1934).15 In the 1956 preface Eliot writes that re-reading some of his early essays, 
including “Hamlet and His Problems,” he is “embarrassed . . . by their callowness, and by a 
facility of unqualified assertion which verges, here and there, on impudence.”16 He goes on to 
write that the “Hamlet, of course, ha[s] been kept afloat all these years by the success of the 
phrase ‘objective correlative’ – a phrase which, I am now told, is not even my own but was 
first used by Washington Alston (sic.).”17  
  Washington Allston (1779-1843) was an American, a New England painter and writer 
who died some 45 years before Eliot was born. Allston came from Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, and is considered the first important American artist to show the influence of 
Romanticism in his work.18 However, like Eliot who was born in St. Louis, Missouri but 
spent most of his life in England, Allston felt deep affinity with the culture of Europe, and 
studied painting in London and Italy. He was also on intimate terms with Coleridge, 
Wordsworth and Southey, founding figures in the English Romantic tradition. Allston wrote 
poetry, a novel in the Gothic style titled Monaldi (1841),19 and the first art treatise by an 
                                                 
14 Eliot, Essays on Elizabethan Drama. 
15 Eliot, Selected Essays; Eliot, Elizabethan Essays. A number of these essays had already appeared in The 
Sacred Wood (1920) such as “Hamlet and His Problems” and “Tradition And The Individual Talent.”  
16 Eliot, Essays on Elizabethan Drama, vii. 
17 Eliot, Essays on Elizabethan Drama, vii-viii; see also Eliot “A Letter from Eliot,” 361. 
18 Chilvers, "Allston, Washington." 
19 Allston, Monaldi.   
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American, Lectures on Art, and Poems (1850), published posthumously.20 He was on the 
periphery of the Transcendentalists, having a review of his very successful 1839 exhibition 
published in the first issue of The Dial, in 1840.21 
  The obvious question is whether or to what extent Eliot read Allston’s work, and it 
seems unlikely he had any direct knowledge of it.22 Eliot himself does not seem convinced 
that he arrived at the term via an encounter with Allston. The mildly incredulous tone of his 
reference in the 1956 preface, the suggestion that he was “told” about this link, and the fact 
that he misspells Allston’s name, all suggest a general unfamiliarity with Allston. It is 
possible that Eliot was exposed to Allston’s poetry during his undergraduate years at 
Harvard, but highly unlikely; Eliot studied literature and philosophy, and Allston was 
foremost a painter and not part of the canon of established poets and writers. Eliot wrote in 
1946 that “[u]ndergraduates at Harvard in my time read the English poets of the [18]90s who 
were dead: that was as near as we could get to any living tradition.”23 Furthermore, under the 
influence of Irving Babbitt, a Harvard professor, Eliot turned firmly against Romanticism, 
espousing a lifelong commitment to classicism.24 However, there is a distinct possibility that 
Eliot may have encountered Allston’s work as a painter (and thus, possibly, knew of his 
treatise on art) through Edward Waldo Forbes, whose undergraduate Fine Arts course on 
                                                 
20 Chilvers, "Allston, Washington;" Allston, Lectures on Art, and Poems. 
21 Belasco, “The Dial;” see also Wayne, 11-2. 
22 See Jain, T.S. Eliot and American Philosophy for an exhaustive overview of Eliot’s Harvard education and 
influences. No mention of Allston is made in this book. From 1909-1910 Eliot did complete a course on 
“Studies in the Poets of the Romantic Period” which was, no doubt, concentrated on the canon of mostly 
English authors (see Jain, 254).   
23 Eliot, Invention of the March Hare, 388. This statement originally appeared in the journal Poetry, in 
September 1946.  
24 Cuda, “The Poet and the Pressure Chamber: Eliot’s Life,” 4-5.  
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Florentine Painting Eliot took in 1910. Forbes, who was the grandson of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, greatly admired the religious paintings of Allston, and we know that Eliot’s studies 
under Forbes involved a special focus on religious art.25 Thus it is not unlikely that Eliot had 
heard of Allston and possibly knew of, or had seen his paintings. Eliot may also have 
encountered Allston indirectly; given the Unitarianism of his family in St Louis and the 
strength of the St Louis German Idealist and Transcendental philosophical tradition, there is a 
chance he may, in his childhood, have been exposed to Allston’s ideas, or even the phrase 
“objective correlative.”26 One scholar even argues that the idea of the “objective correlative” 
formed part of the intellectual vocabulary of thought in nineteenth-century New England, 
spreading beyond Allston to others.27 These links, though tenuous, make the intriguing, 
vestigial similarities between Eliot’s use of “objective correlative” and Allston’s less 
surprising, and suggest these similarities are worth investigating. 
  Allston uses the term only once, in his Lectures on Art, and Poems. He discusses Neo-
Platonism arguing that it has aspects to it which are proto-phenomenological. The argument 
centres on the notion of our apprehension of “Ideas” which are “the highest or most perfect 
form in which any thing . . . may exist in the mind.”28 Objects become conscious to the mind, 
in the form of Ideas, for two reasons, either as “manifestations of objective realities” or as the 
                                                 
25 Under Forbes’s instruction Eliot made careful sketches of religious images from Italian art. Forbes later 
donated these sketches to Harvard, see Crawford, Young Eliot. Eliot’s grandfather William Greenleaf Eliot was 
a founding father of St Louis and noticed by Emerson; see Moody, Tracing T.S. Eliot’s Spirit, 3.  
26 See Crawford, Young Eliot for Eliot’s Unitarian upbringing and his encounter with Forbes. See also Sigg, The 
American T.S. Eliot for another account of the household Unitarianism of Eliot’s youth.  
27 Duffy, “T. S. Eliot's Objective Correlative: A New England Commonplace.” 
28 Allston, Lectures on Art, and Poems, 3. 
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“reflex product” of our mental constitution.29 For Allston the “external world” is manifest in 
the mind because the world is the mind’s “objective correlative.”30 The mind is pre-
determined to be cognizant of “objective realities” because it possesses a “pre-existing idea 
[of them] in its living power.”31 In addition, the proper end of this correlation is the 
experience of pleasure or satisfaction.32 The pre-determined correlation between the mind and 
external reality exists because both are located in the “unchangeable ground of Truth.”33 
Evidently, there is an underlying pseudo-Kantian position developed here; Allston wants to 
suggest that the mind is “pre-determined” to understand the world in an intelligible way. 
Thus categories of the mind cohere with outside phenomena. But Allston goes beyond Kant, 
aligning himself with Transcendentalism, and German Idealism generally, in that he argues 
that we are able to understand the world because both mind and reality are grounded in the 
divine, i.e. “unchangeable Truth,” and so self-knowledge and self-development can enable 
this appreciation.34    
  When we compare Allston’s use of the term with Eliot’s, we can understand his 
incredulity at the suggestion that his “objective correlative” comes from Allston. Eliot’s 
development of the term is very much literary and removed from the Transcendentalist 
heights of Allston’s idealism. Yet there are similarities. Both argue that a mental state 
corresponds with external phenomena; and in both cases the proper alignment of the two 
results in some kind of experience: for Eliot, a genuine emotive audience response, and for 
                                                 
29 Allston, Lectures on Art, and Poems, 3. 
30 Allston, Lectures on Art, and Poems, 16. 
31 Allston, Lectures on Art, and Poems, 16. 
32 Allston, Lectures on Art, and Poems, 16. 
33 Allston, Lectures on Art, and Poems, 3. 
34 Wayne, viii.  
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Allston, a grasp of the divine order of things. Thus when the mind appreciates and 
understands reality in the fitting way, the experience that follows is one of truth, whether 
aesthetic or transcendent.    
  In addition to the term “objective correlative,” Allston and Eliot also share some 
interesting biographic similarities which are suggestive, but tangential to this paper’s main 
argument. Both came from a Unitarian background and studied at Harvard, Allston from 
1796-1800, Eliot from 1906-1916 when he finished his doctoral thesis while already living in 
England. Both were successful poets, although Eliot was certainly more so than Allston. Both 
had a complex relationship with religious faith. In 1809 Allston married Ann Channing. Her 
untimely death in 1815, while they were living in London, affected him profoundly. Richard 
Henry Dana,35 writes that after Allston’s wife’s death he developed an “undivided interest in 
spiritual relations” and received the rite of confirmation, becoming a devout adherent to 
Christian doctrine and discipline.36 Allston remained strongly Unitarian in his religious 
outlook, stating around 1830, “I am neither an Episcopalian nor a Congregationalist, I 
endeavour to be a Christian.”37  He notes in one of his letters written in 1830 that he was 
especially drawn to paint Biblical subjects and that the Scripture was a “source of inspiration” 
for his art.38 There is much evidence for this in his paintings, many of which depict religious 
events. 
                                                 
35 Richard Henry Dana, Sr. (1787-1879) was a minor novelist and poet. He was the first American critic of 
Romanticism.  
36 Dana, Introduction, vi. Dana is somewhat hagiographic in his description of Allston. 
37 Flagg, The Life and Letters of Washington Allston, 245-6. 
38 Flagg, The Life and Letters of Washington Allston, 233. 
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  Eliot’s conversion circumstances were somewhat different.39 When he very deliberately 
converted to Anglo-Catholicism in 1927, he was nearly estranged from his first wife, 
Vivienne Haigh-Wood. Their tumultuous and dysfunctional marriage was maintained with 
the barest façade of domesticity until 1932, when he went to America to deliver the Charles 
Eliot Norton poetry lectures at Harvard. When he returned to England in 1933 he separated 
from Vivienne and gradually immersed himself fully in the life of his parish, St Stephen’s in 
Kensington, with a level of devotion akin to a tertiary member of a religious order.40 Like 
Allston, Eliot after his conversion was deeply inspired and influenced by his Christianity, 
producing in Four Quartets (1939-1942) a poetic testament to his struggle with and 
redemption through faith. There is a remote possibility that Eliot may have been drawn to 
Allston’s work if he learnt of the similarities between their life experiences. However, Eliot’s 
essay on Hamlet, where the term “objective correlative” appears, was published in 1919, 
nearly a decade before he converted to Anglo-Catholicism. Thus, if Eliot had read Allston’s 
letters, lectures or poems for some kind of solace during his own spiritual and domestic 
struggles, it would have been after the publication of the Hamlet essay, and thus of no 
consequence to this argument. 
   
II. 
Keeping in chronological order, as far as is possible, the next person to consider is the 
philosopher Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924), on whom Eliot wrote his PhD thesis.41 
                                                 
39 The question of whether Unitarianism is indeed a form of Christianity is historically complex. See Ahlstrom’s 
masterful A Religious History of the American People for a chronological overview of its development.  
40 Spurr, “Anglo-Catholic in Religion,” 115-16.   
41 Eliot, Knowledge and Experience. See Mallinson, T.S. Eliot’s Interpretation of F.H. Bradley for a sustained 
examination of Eliot’s engagement with Bradley.  
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Bradley, based at Oxford University, was Britain’s last significant neo-Hegelian, working in 
the tradition of German Idealism before it was eclipsed by the advent of modern logic and 
analytic philosophy. Eliot personally experienced this change in British philosophy, since he 
wrote on Bradley but then, for a time, came under the influence of Bertrand Russell.42 Eliot’s 
debt to Bradley can be overstated; Anne C. Bolgan, for example, claims that “it is patently 
clear to anyone who has studied the work of both [Eliot and Bradley] that it is Bradley’s mind 
that lies behind the structuring principles of Eliot’s poetry, as well as every major theoretical 
concept appearing in his literary criticism.”43 This is a claim far too general to be effectively 
substantiated, given the breadth of Eliot’s learning. Bolgan’s idea that Eliot’s works show a 
“structuring principle” grounded in Bradley’s Hegelian holism is suggestive, however. 
Simply put, holism is the belief that “the meaning of any thing is never autonomously given 
but is always a function of its place and interrelations with other things in a wider whole.”44 
This notion can be seen in Eliot’s thinking about the nature of the literary canon, for example, 
in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1917) where he declares that “the historical sense 
compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling 
that the whole of the literature of Europe . . . has a simultaneous existence and composes a 
simultaneous order.”45 
                                                 
42 Russell’s influence on Eliot was formative and equivocal; see Schusterman “Eliot as Philosopher,” 35-8. 
Some scholars have tried to argue, unconvincingly, that Eliot’s “objective correlative” shows Russell’s 
influence; see Green, Bertrand Russell: Language and Linguistic Theory, 155; Shusterman, “Eliot and Logical 
Atomism;” also Skaff, The Philosophy of T.S. Eliot. Like Habib, 271, I think these positions overstated.  
43 Bolgan, “The Philosophy of Bradley and the Mind and Art of Eliot,” 253. Bolgan was instrumental in the 
formal publication of Eliot’s PhD in 1964. 
44 Shusterman, “Eliot as Philosopher,” 33.  
45 Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 44. 
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  Given this deep sympathy of thought, a parallel between Eliot’s “objective correlative” 
and aspects of Bradley’s ideas would not be surprising.46 The term itself does not appear in 
Bradley’s work, but we can discern clear lines of thought which echo it. For example, in 
Bradley’s Essays on Truth and Reality (1914), parts of which Eliot quotes in his PhD thesis, 
Bradley writes that “every idea, even of failure, works successfully in producing a 
corresponding attitude or other change in my body or some part of it . . . [T]o speak in 
general, an idea tends thus to express itself emotionally.”47 This claim about the relational 
nature of ideas and their corresponding emotional effect on the body is very much in line with 
Eliot’s own claims. Bradley goes on to write that in  
 
. . . any emotion one part of that emotion consists already of objects, of perceptions and 
ideas before my mind. And, the whole emotion being one, the special group of feeling is 
united with these objects before my mind, united with them integrally and directly . . . 
There are features in feeling which already in a sense belong to and are one with their 
object, since the emotion contains and unites both its aspects.48  
 
If we consider these ideas in light of Eliot’s “objective correlative” there are similarities. 
While Bradley is concerned with the individual’s own experience of ideas and their relation 
to emotion within an idealist framework, Eliot is concerned with how the artist is able to 
effectively convey her ideas (which are associated with a particular emotion) to the audience 
                                                 
46 Frank’s “T.S. Eliot’s Objective Correlative and the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley,” 311-17 for a relatively 
unsuccessful attempt to locate this parallel.  
47 Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 80, note 1. 
48 Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 169. Eliot quotes this passage in his thesis. See Eliot, Knowledge and 
Experience, 24.   
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via the artwork. Bradley continues: “when a felt emotion is described, a man may feel that the 
description agrees or does not agree with an actual fact of which he is aware . . . And it is, 
largely or mainly, because these suggestions are felt to be in unison or discord with 
something already felt as present, that they are accepted or rejected.”49 Here again we can 
discern an echo in Eliot’s work, particularly with regard to the failure of an artwork, such as 
Hamlet, which lacks an “objective correlative.” The artist conveys an emotion through the 
artwork in order to evoke that emotional response in the audience. The “object” of that 
emotion, in Eliot’s case the character Gertrude, fails to elicit the emotions of loathing and 
disgust, and thus there is no accord with the audience.  
  The last suggestive link to Bradley is a point Eliot develops in his own thesis, in 
agreement with a position developed by Bradley.50 Essentially Eliot claims that “emotion is 
really part of the object, and is ultimately just as objective.”51 Emotional experiences are not 
pure abstractions, but psychical phenomena attached to physical structures. For example, to 
recall an object which is associated with pleasure is also to recall the experience of pleasure; 
the object and the emotion correlate.  
 
III. 
Another important source for Eliot’s “objective correlative” comes from the work of the 
founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938).52 Again, the link can be over-
estimated; Sanford Schwartz for example claims that Eliot deliberately and consciously lifts 
                                                 
49 Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 185.  
50 Bradley, “A Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology.” 
51 Eliot, Knowledge and Experience, 80.  
52 See Kumar, “Consciousness and Its Correlatives: Eliot and Husserl,” for an interesting overview of Eliot’s 
own phenomenology, as developed in his doctoral thesis, and its relation to Husserl.   
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the term from Husserl.53 Husserl does uses the phrase “objective correlate” [objektive 
Korrelat], which appears numerous times in his Logical Investigations (1900/1). Eliot read 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations in its second 1913 German edition; his annotated copy of 
Logische Untersuchungen is in the London library.54 Significantly this edition does not 
include the second part of the second volume, containing the Sixth Investigation, which was 
included in the first 1900/1 edition and only again in the 1921 edition.55 Unable to revise the 
Sixth Investigation in 1913 as he intended Husserl withheld it, and sent only the first five 
Investigations to press. These make up the two volumes of the book Eliot read.56 In the 1913 
edition, without the Sixth Investigation, the term objektive Korrelat appears only four times,57 
though in the Sixth Investigation, which Eliot did not have, it appears more frequently.  
  Eliot read the book while on a travelling fellowship to attend a summer programme for 
foreign students at Marburg University in the spring of 1914, five years before the 
publication of the Hamlet essay. At this period, all “student[s] of Idealism” at Harvard were 
expected to spend time at German universities.58 He did not personally study with Husserl, 
                                                 
53 Schwartz, The Matrix of Modernism, 9. 
54 The weathered edition of Eliot’s Logische Untersuchungen was presented to the London Library by Mrs 
Michael Roberts in March 1952. On the title page is a faint, pencilled inscription: “T. S. Eliot, Marburg 1914.” 
55 Moran, Introduction, lxvi, note 1.  
56 Moran, Introduction, xxxvill. 
57 In the 1913 edition the term objective Korrelat appears in volume I, on page 134 as objektives Korrelat and on 
page 186, objektiven Korrelaten. In volume II it appears on page 25, objective Korrelat and on page 460, 
objektives Korrelat. 
58 Kirk. Eliot and His Age, 29. Gordon, T.S. Eliot, 95. Eliot had barely settled into life at Marburg when the First 
World War broke out and he left for Britain; see the introduction by Brooker and Schuchard in Eliot, The 
Complete Prose of T.S. Eliot: Apprentice Years, Volume 1, xli – xliii for an account of Eliot’s transition from 
Marburg to London, and his being interviewed by the New York Times in this regard. 
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who at this stage of his ascending career was still at the University of Göttingen. Eliot was in 
Germany only very briefly as the events of Sarajevo began to engulf Europe barely a month 
after he arrived. He left Germany on the 3 August 1914.59 He started reading Logical 
Investigations while in Marburg, since he mentions the book’s title in a letter (dated 25 July 
1914) which he sent to Conrad Aiken, his closest early friend and fellow student at Harvard.60 
That the letter is to a fellow student perhaps explains why Eliot refers to the book only by its 
German title, and in passing. He is more expansive about Husserl’s work again in a letter 
dated 5 October 1914, addressed to his Harvard Professor of Philosophy, J.M Woods. Eliot 
writes, “I have been plugging away at Hüsserl, and find it terribly hard, but very interesting; 
and I like very much what I think I understand of it.”61 This letter to Woods was written from 
Merton College, Oxford, showing that Eliot continued his study of Husserl after he left 
Germany.  
  In the English translation of Logical Investigations the phrase “objective correlate” 
often stands in for two distinct German terms used by Husserl, namely the more direct 
objektive Korrelat and also Gegenständlichkeit Korrelat. The latter term, particularly 
Gegenstand (object) is common in the Logische Untersuchungen. Eliot would also have been 
thoroughly familiar with it through the work of Alexius Meinong, known for his theory of 
objects [Gegenstandstheorie]. In a letter written in 1956 Eliot indicates that at the same time 
                                                 
59 Gordon, Imperfect Life, 96. Phenomenology had by 1914 attained a huge following in Germany and by the 
1920s Husserl was the leading philosopher in Germany, until his work was eclipsed by that of his student, 
Martin Heidegger, with the publication of Being and Time (1927).  
60 Eliot, The Letters of T.S. Eliot. Volume 1, 49.  
61 Eliot. The Letters of T.S. Eliot. Volume 1, 65. Eliot’s own annotations in his copy of Logische Untersuchungen 
seem to confirm this difficulty. In volume II on pages 348-350 we see the words “Rubbish” and ‘What the devil 
does this mean?” added to the text.  
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he was reading Husserl he was also reading Meinong.62 He makes substantial references to 
Meinong’s theory in numerous graduate essays and his PhD thesis particularly.63 In the 
English translation of the Logical Investigations the translator makes the point that 
“objectivity” would be the more direct translation of Gegenständlichkeit, but this term can 
imply that Husserl limits his understanding of objects only to physical things, whereas in fact 
he means to include “states of affairs, properties, and non-independent forms.”64 Thus, as we 
will see from the discussion below, the term “objective” is preferred, and gives a better sense 
of what Husserl means.  
  In the First Investigation Husserl distinguishes between categories of meaning and 
objective categories, arguing that the latter are “objective correlates” of the former.65 His 
focus is on the nature of expression, and he writes that each expression “not merely says 
something, but says it of something: it not only has a meaning, but refers to certain objects . . 
. But the object never coincides with the meaning. Both, of course, only pertain to an 
expression in virtue of the mental acts which give it sense.”66 The language we use to speak 
about objects makes sense because there is an intentional, conscious relation between our 
                                                 
62 Eliot, The Complete Prose of T.S. Eliot: The Critical Edition. Volume 2, The Perfect Critic, 731-2, note 6.   
63 Three of Eliot’s graduate essays Degrees of Reality, Suggestions toward a Theory of Objects and The Validity 
of Artificial Distinctions feature or allude to Meinong’s theory of objects, and he is mentioned substantially in 
Eliot’s PhD thesis. Also, in Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation which Eliot studied at 
Harvard the term “objective correlative” appears once as “objective Korrelat.” See Schopenhauer, The World as 
Will, 216; Die Welt als Wille, 453. See also Virkar-Yates, “An Objective Chemistry.” 
64 Findlay, translator’s note in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Volume 1, 321. 
65 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, 196 onwards; for the German see Husserl, Logische 
Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, 46. See also Steadman, “Eliot and Husserl: The Origin of the “Objective 
Correlative”,” 262. 
66 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, 197.  
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expression about the object and the object itself. However, this relationship is in no way 
fixed, but only a correlation, which is dependent on the mental act which establishes the 
relation. 
  Husserl uses the example of different languages which express the same object, e.g. 
“London,” “Londres,” “伦敦 (Lúndūn)” to show this.67 This phenomenon is significant for 
Husserl because it draws attention to an expression’s “meaning and its power to direct itself 
as a name to this or that objective correlate . . . an expression only refers to an objective 
correlate because it means something[;] it can be rightly said to signify or name the object 
through its meaning.”68 An expression is an act of meaning directed at something, but this 
does not fix the expression to the object. The context and inter-subjective nature of an 
expression are part of why it is meaningful, and these can change. However, these acts intend 
the “objective correlate of our act of meaning” to stand before us intuitively as the “very 
object we mean.”69  
  Aside from the philosophic discussion to explore Husserl’s terminology there is some 
tantalizing marginalia on page 25 of the second volume of Eliot’s copy of Logische 
Untersuchungen where the term objektive Korrelat appears. Eliot has underlined some of the 
sentences, though not the term itself. I will quote each sentence entirely and indicate what is 
underlined:  
A thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to indicate 
something to some thinking being.70 (…) In these we discover as a common 
circumstance the fact that certain objects or states of affairs of whose reality someone 
                                                 
67 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, 197. See also Simons, “Meaning and Language,” 111.  
68 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, 198. 
69 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, 200. 
70 This is underlined horizontally. Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, 184. The underlined German is  
“. . . einem denkenden Wesen . . .”. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, 25.  
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has actual knowledge indicate to him the reality of certain other objects or states of 
affairs, in the sense that his belief in the reality of the one is experienced (though not 
at all evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other.71 (…) 
Plainly such a state of affairs amounts to just this: that certain things may or must 
exist, since other things have been given. This 'since', taken as expressing an objective 
connection, is the objective correlate of 'motivation' taken as a descriptively peculiar 
way of combining acts of judgement into a single act of judgement.72  
 
In this section Husserl discusses the relationship between signs, which are indicative of a 
state of affairs, and our judgement which results from making inferences from these signs. He 
argues that there is always a broader context of meaning, based on previous acts of 
judgement, which informs current judgements. However, this exists as a “unity of 
judgements”, an “objective correlate” between previous judgements and the current one.73 We 
can see that this is similar to what has already been discussed with regard to language, mental 
acts and their contexts. Our intentional relationship with the world is always already 
grounded in layers of meaning which inform, and are inextricable part of whatever particular 
speech act or act of judgement we are attentive to in the moment. 
                                                 
71 This section is highlighted by a vertical line in the margin. In the German version this section is not italicized. 
Husserl, Logical Investigations. Volume 1, 184. The German is “. . . den Umstand, daß irgendwelche 
Gegenstände oder Sachverhalte, von deren Bestand jemand aktuelle Kenntnis hat, ihm den Bestand gewisser 
anderer Gegenstände oder Sachverhalte in dem Sinne anzeigen, daß die Überzeugung von dem Sein der einen 
von ihm als Motiv (und zwar als ein nichteinsichtiges Motiv) erlebt wird für die Überzeugung oder Vermutung 
vom Sein der anderen.”  Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, 25. 
72 This is underlined horizontally. Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, 184. The underlined German is 
“Dieses ,,well“, als Ausdruck eines sachlichen Zusammenhanges aufgefaßt . . .”. Husserl, Logische 
Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, 25. 
73 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, 184 
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  The term is significant at two further points in Husserl’s book. In the First Investigation 
it appears again at a later stage, used in much the same way as described only now Husserl is 
discussing the nature of “pure logic.”74 Pure logic is arrived at through the phenomenological 
reduction of “concepts, judgements, and syllogisms” to their “ideal unities.” This reduction is 
achieved through detaching the “ideal essence of meanings” from their “psychological and 
grammatical connections,” essentially disengaging these essences from the “objective 
correlates that they mean.”75  This ideal domain is that of pure logic, the nomological science 
of which modern symbolic logic is an example. The final substantive discussion of “objective 
correlate” occurs in the Sixth Investigation, which was not included in Eliot’s edition. An 
important section here is §43 which is titled “The objective correlates of categorical forms are 
not ‘real’ moments.”76 Husserl makes a technical philosophical point about Kantian 
categorical forms such as quantity and quality. Essentially he argues that forms such as these, 
like symbolic logic, have no “objective correlates” themselves in terms of objects occurring 
in the “real,” i.e. external world. For example, though the quality of smoothness or 
abrasiveness is part of an object such as a wooden surface, “smoothness” itself has no 
objective correlate as such.77  
  From this initial discussion it is clear that there are some superficial similarities but 
perhaps more importantly significant differences between Eliot’s “objective correlative” and 
Husserl’s “objective correlate.” There is certainly a level of sophistication and detail in 
Husserl’s account which is lacking in Eliot’s. For Husserl, meaning is possible because of 
                                                 
74 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, 224. This English edition is published in two separate volumes. 
Part of Volume 2, which is where this discussed material comes from, is included in the first volume.    
75 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, 224. 
76 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 2, 277. 
77 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 2, 277-8. 
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mental acts and their contexts which establish an intentional link between an expression and 
its object, thus allowing them to “correlate” meaningfully. On this level the relationship is 
“objective” in a scientific sense because the correlation is always between mental acts and 
their contexts. For a phenomenologist, every mind which thinks, thinks in this direct, 
intentional way. When we interrogate this fundamental orientation we have with the world, 
what is revealed is this phenomenological arrangement. On another level, what is also 
revealed is our own historicity and worldhood, what Martin Heidegger calls “thrownness,” 
[Geworfenheit] which is subjective and seemingly arbitrary. We find ourselves already in 
meaning, in language and in a context which makes the world cohere and orientates us in it. 
Husserl shows that language allows us to direct and articulate our conscious thoughts to the 
objects around us such that there is a correlation between what is thought and what is meant. 
Language is the interpretive “glue” which sticks the mental act and the physical phenomenon 
together. But the language is itself contextual and forms part of a particular worldview and 
worldhood. 
  Eliot also argues for a correlation, but in a less rigorous way than Husserl. In his PhD 
Eliot holds that emotions cohere in objects and that if the artist arranges these objects 
properly she will evoke the desired response in the audience. However, these claims are more 
ambiguous because of their uninterrogated naïve idealism. Eliot’s “objective correlative” 
seems to imply, like Husserl to some extent, that “objective” should be understood in its 
proper, scientific sense, suggesting that there are underlying, universal objects which can 
evoke the desired emotional response from an audience, or fail to. But, unlike Husserl, Eliot 
does not develop this position at all, which is deeply problematic because it overlooks the 
hermeneutic dimension that plays a role in all human experience, particularly in the 
appreciation and interpretation of art. In addition, Eliot’s term commits the intentional 
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fallacy, for it assumes that authorial intent and audience reception should be directly 
connected via the artwork – that there should, in fact, be an “objective” correlation. 
  Yet, and perhaps this shows up why Eliot was more an artist than philosopher, if we 
read his famous essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent” written in 1917, two years before 
the Hamlet essay, he seems to contradict what he claims in 1919.78 In the earlier essay he 
writes that the “progress of the artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of 
personality . . . to something which is more valuable.”79 The creation of the artist is a process 
of “depersonalization,” “an escape from personality”; “the more perfect the artist, the more 
completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates.”80 Here 
Eliot argues that the creation of the artwork ultimately exists independently of the personality 
of its creator, a central tenet of New Criticism of which he is considered a founder. But in the 
Hamlet essay he seems to hold the artist personally responsible for her ability to evoke the 
proper emotive response in the audience, which, as we shall see below, is a position shared 
with Bergson. 
  In spite of the somewhat “unwieldy” nature of Eliot’s early criticism it is worth noting 
the general currency these ideas had. For example, Heidegger, a direct contemporary of Eliot, 
wrote in 1935 that “in great art the artist remains something inconsequential in comparison 
with the work – almost like a passageway which, in the creative process, destroys itself for 
the sake of the coming forth of the work.”81 He echoes these sentiments again in 1955, writing 
                                                 
78 It is somewhat ironic that both these essays appeared in print in the same year, 1919, even though they appear 
to contradict one another. “Tradition and the Individual Talent” was published in The Egoist, a London literary 
review – see Murphy, Critical Companion to T.S. Eliot, 405. 
79 Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 47. 
80 Eliot, The Sacred Wood, 47-8, 52.  
81 Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, 19.  
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about the composer Conradin Kreutzer, that the artist’s presence in the work is the “only true 
presence. The greater the master, the more completely his person vanishes behind his 
work.”82 These claims resonate with Eliot’s own claims about artist depersonalization.   
  Also suggestive, although tangential to a discussion of Eliot, is the fact that the term 
“objective correlate” [Gegenständliche Korrelat] appears in Heidegger’s work. When Husserl 
transferred to the University of Freiburg from Göttingen in 1916, Heidegger worked as his 
assistant from 1919 to 1923 before transferring to Marburg. It is perhaps no surprise then that 
ideas reminiscent of the “objective correlate” appear in Heidegger’s early work. Heidegger 
uses the term “objective correlate” in a strongly critical review essay of Karl Jaspers’s 
recently published Psychology of Worldviews (1919).83 This essay, though written between 
1919-1920, was only published in 1972 after a copy of it was found among Jaspers’s papers 
after his death in 1969. Heidegger had written the draft and sent it to Jaspers, Husserl and 
Heinrich Rickert in 1921 but, for unknown reasons, decided not to publish it at that time.84  
  In the essay Heidegger criticises Jaspers’s “preconception” that the subject, in order to 
understand the “object” or “whole” of reality, requires a “theoretical, observational attitude” 
as a “correlative” way of understanding it.85 For Heidegger this preconception implies that the 
“fundamental characteristic of the objective correlate of this theoretical attitude lies in the 
fact that it is an objective thing.”86 This is precisely the problem for Heidegger: Jaspers’s 
                                                 
82 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, 44. 
83 Heidegger, “Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews.”  
84 Krell, Intimations of Mortality, 11.  
85 Heidegger, “Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews,” 18.  
86 Heidegger, “Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews,” 18. The German sentence is “Das 
besagt, das gegenständliche Korrelat solcher Einstellung hat den Grundgegenstandscharakter der objektiven 
Sache,”  Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Band 9: Wegmarken, 21.  
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initial approach to psychical life is based on a preconception about the nature of psychical life 
which already forms part of the “objective” and “primordial” observations he wants to 
make.87 Heidegger questions whether this preconception “enjoys the level of primordiality 
that is claimed for it” and whether the motives which drive Jaspers along his interrogative 
path are made evident.88 For Heidegger clearly they are not. Jaspers believes that his method, 
which he calls “mere observation,” can observe “simply that which exists and is there for us 
so far in human experience.89 But this ignores the historicized nature of all observation, the 
fact that “our observing of phenomena of life is historical, insofar as it must inevitably be 
interpretive.”90 In order to understand the methodology that observation entails I must 
interpret its nature within the context where it occurs. As Heidegger’s Being and Time puts it, 
any “interpretation which is to contribute understanding must already have understood what 
is to be interpreted.”91 Thus the prejudices and presuppositions which direct observation must 
be examined and interpreted, and this is what Jaspers neglects to consider.  
  Heidegger’s criticism of Jaspers is helpful here because we see the same kind of 
“blindness” in Eliot’s Hamlet essay, which assumes a straightforward, unexamined and 
supposedly “objective” correlation between the intentions of the artist and the reception of 
the audience. Heidegger concludes his essay by arguing that “mere observation” must evolve 
“into an ‘infinite process’ of radical questioning that always includes itself in its questions 
and preserves itself in them.”92 Essentially he requires constant cognisance of the hermeneutic 
                                                 
87 Heidegger, “Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews,” 7.   
88 Heidegger, “Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews,” 19.  
89 Heidegger, “Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews,” 32. Heidegger is quoting Jaspers here.  
90 Heidegger, “Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews,” 33.   
91 Heidegger, Being and Time, 194.  
92 Heidegger, “Comments on Karl Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews,” 37.   
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circle which, if ignored, makes “mere observation” a phenomenologically naïve and 
misguided process – a criticism as valid for Eliot as is it for Jaspers. As an aside, Eliot does 
mention Heidegger’s name a few times in his letters and in The Criterion in 1932, but that is 
unfortunately the extent of their engagement.93 
 
IV. 
Another philosopher who Eliot not only read, but whose lectures he also attended at the 
Collège de France for two months during his 1910-1911 sojourn in Paris, was Henri Bergson 
(1859-1941).94 Eliot even admitted to a “temporary conversion to Bergsonism,”95 though after 
returning to Harvard he wrote an essay as part of his doctoral work specifically criticizing 
what he saw as inconsistencies in Bergson’s philosophy.96 This graduate essay, 
                                                 
93 Eliot, “A Commentary,” 73. In 1930 in a letter to Erich Alport Eliot writes “I should very much like also to 
read something of Heidegger. During the month of August 1914, I sat in Marburg, smoking cigars and reading 
the works of Husserl, and I still know just enough about the subject to be extremely interested in the work of a 
disciple.”  In 1931 in a letter to Stephen Spender Eliot writes “Have you found anything worth reading? There is 
a philosopher named Martin Heidegger – a disciple of the great Husserl, who really is good, I think, though far 
from lucid – whom I have been agonising over.” See Eliot, The Letters of T.S. Eliot, Volume 5, 228, 529.  The 
phrasing is ambiguous, leaving us to guess whether Eliot means agonising over whether or not to read 
Heidegger, or instead, agonising over Being and Time itself. Sein und Zeit was published in 1927 in Husserl’s 
Jahrbuch and established Heidegger’s international reputation as a philosopher, solidifying his early academic 
career. While Heidegger had published some other texts around the time Eliot was writing these letters it seems 
likely that if he did read anything by Heidegger it would have been Sein und Zeit.   
94 See Hargrove, T. S. Eliot's Parisian Year for an account of what Eliot’s experience of Paris would have been 
like.  
95 Eliot, A Sermon Preached in Magdalene College Chapel, 5. 
96 Dating this manuscript on Bergson has proved puzzling for Eliot scholars, though most agree that it was either 
written in 1913 or 1914, after Eliot had returned to Harvard to write his PhD. See Habib, The Early T.S. Eliot 
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Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism and another, The Relationship between Politics and 
Metaphysics, both delivered by Eliot to the Harvard Philosophical Club around 1913-1914, 
are critical of Bergson.97 Evident from these essays, particularly the first, is Eliot’s strong 
familiarity with Bergson’s major works.98 While Bergson does not explicitly use the term 
“objective correlate,” he alludes to ideas which clearly imply a sense of it. These are 
developed in more of an aesthetic than a philosophical sense in his Time and Free Will: An 
Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness.99 Bergson argues that the “charm of poetry” 
is derived from the poet in “whom feelings develop into images, and the images themselves 
into words.” When we, as readers, experience these images in the poetry, we in turn 
experience the feelings that are the “emotional equivalents” of the ones experienced by the 
poet; to paraphrase Bergson, we think and see with the poet.100 He goes on to write that the 
aim of art is to impress feelings on us, rather than to induce us to express them: the artwork 
“suggests them to us, and willingly dispenses with the imitation of nature when it finds some 
more efficacious means.”101  
                                                 
and Western Philosophy, 61ff. See also Le Brun, “T.S. Eliot and Henri Bergson,” and note 2 in Eliot, The 
Complete Prose of T.S. Eliot: The Critical Edition, Volume 1, 88. 
97 Eliot, The Complete Prose of T.S. Eliot: The Critical Edition, Volume 1, 67-105. For an overview of what 
these graduate essays discuss see Brooker and Schuchard’s introduction in Eliot, The Complete Prose of T.S. 
Eliot: The Critical Edition, Volume 1, xxxvii-xxxviii & xl-xli. 
98 Eliot references Bergson’s L’Évolution Créatice (1907) [Creative Evolution], Essai sur les Données 
Immédiates de la Conscience (1889) [Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness] 
(1889) and Matière et Mémoire: Essai sur la Relation du Corps a l’Esprit (1896) [Matter and Memory]. 
99 Bergson, Time and Free Will, Eliot obviously uses the original French version. The first English translation 
appeared in 1910.   
100 Habib, The Early T.S. Eliot and Western Philosophy, 45. See Bergson, Time and Free Will, 15. 
101 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 17. 
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  This aesthetic emotion is experienced with varying degrees of intensity. It may scarcely 
distract us from our immediate involvement with the world; it may briefly draw our attention 
away from that involvement; or, most intensely, it may engross us and “monopolize our 
souls.”102 The “merit” of a work of art is measured by the intensity and richness of the 
aesthetic emotion it evokes. Bergson connects this emotion with the artist herself, stating that 
the feelings and thoughts communicated to us by the artwork convey in them a history of the 
artist, her lifeworld and experiences. Thus the aim of the artist is to enable us to experience 
the complexity of emotion which she “cannot make us understand.”103 The artist will attempt 
to communicate these indefinable psychological states by capturing them in the artwork: “the 
richer in ideas and the more pregnant with sensation and emotions is the feeling within whose 
limits the artist has brought us, the deeper and the higher shall we find the beauty thus 
expressed.”104 The successful experience of art is meant to “put to sleep” the resistant powers 
of our own personality, and bring us to a “state of perfect responsiveness” such that we can 
sympathize with the feeling expressed in the artwork. Exactly how and why some artwork 
can achieve this intensity of experience and others not is under-developed and somewhat 
obtuse in Bergson. Essentially the purpose of art is to express beauty, and the essence of the 
beautiful “remains unexplained.”105 He suggests that we “instinctively distinguish degrees of 
depth” in our encounter with the artwork, reflected in the history of the artist.106  
  Examining Eliot’s graduate essay Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism shows that he 
was explicitly attentive to these ideas of aesthetic intensity and their communicability in Time 
                                                 
102 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 17 
103 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 18. 
104 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 18. 
105 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 14. 
106 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 17. Italicisation is my emphasis.  
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and Free Will, referencing them closely and describing one passage by Bergson, in this 
context, as “remarkable.”107 Evidently there are strong parallels that Eliot’s “objective 
correlative” shares with Bergson’s aesthetic theory of emotion. Both suggest that in the 
encounter with the successful artwork an “emotional equivalence” will emerge which 
resonates between the artist and audience. This allows a communication to occur which, in its 
fullness, has the capacity to “monopolize our soul.” Eliot suggests that Macbeth offers such 
an equivalence, because the artwork is able to successfully convey the emotions of guilt and 
horror which Shakespeare intends. Bergson is also explicit about the role of the artist; her 
lifeworld and experience are encapsulated and communicated in the artwork. While Eliot is 
not as explicit about this dimension in his theory of the “objective correlative,” it is implied. 
 
V. 
In conclusion it is evident that there are many lines of influence which can be drawn to 
Eliot’s “objective correlative.” However, there is no single, direct source for the notion. The 
term is his own, but also fits within the broader currents of thought that surrounded him, and 
to which he was exposed, most notably the remnants of Hegelian idealism. For the idealist, 
mind and reality cohere. Rationality allows us to uncover and discern its truth, particularly in 
the encounter with the artwork. The successful artwork is able to distil some aspects of this 
truth, which the mind, as Bergson suggests, is “instinctively” able to comprehend because it 
is attuned to recognise and appreciate beauty when it encounters it. 
  We cannot discount entirely the influence, even unconscious, of the work of 
Washington Allston, given the Unitarianism of Eliot’s youth and its entanglement with 
Transcendentalism. Nor can we discount the influence Forbes may have had on Eliot through 
                                                 
107 Eliot, The Complete Prose of T.S. Eliot: The Critical Edition, Volume 1, 67-8. 
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his familial relationship to Emerson, and the possibility that he may have introduced Eliot to 
Allston’s painting, and even mentioned his aesthetic theory. Thus, in spite of Eliot’s 
protestation regarding his original claim to the term perhaps its embryonic form had already 
implanted itself in his early intellectual development. 
  While it is convenient to argue that the term’s actual inspiration was Husserl and that 
Eliot merely appropriated it, this claim is not so straightforward to substantiate, especially 
given the edition of Logical Investigations which Eliot read. One could even go so far as to 
argue that Eliot’s 1956 preface, where he mentions somewhat incredulously Allston’s claim 
to the term, provided an ideal opportunity to acknowledge Husserl’s influence. The fact that 
he did not do so suggests that it did not occur to him, because he probably had no recollection 
that the term was Husserl’s, and that he might have encountered a German version of it first 
in Logical Investigations. Also, it is evident from the above discussion that Husserl is using 
the term in a complex phenomenological sense, whereas Eliot’s use is much less developed, 
and closer to idealism. The two conceptions are different to such an extent that if Eliot did 
appropriate the term from Husserl (which we cannot entirely discount given the temporal 
proximity of his reading and annotating Logical Investigations and writing “Hamlet and His 
Problems”) then it was only as an unconscious borrowing of the expression itself, and not the 
particular way Husserl develops it. However, it seems likely that the confluence of Husserl 
and Meinong, and their widespread use of the term Gegenstand in its various philosophic 
iterations, must have played some role in Eliot’s development of his own term.  
  This leaves us to consider Bergson and Bradley, who both provide ideas which, I think, 
strongly and evidently influenced Eliot’s development of his “objective correlative.” We 
know that Eliot wrote critically on Bergson as part of his PhD studies, around 1913-14, 
specifically mentioning his aesthetic emotive theory which is very similar to Eliot’s own. 
Bergson’s claim for an “emotional equivalence” communicated from the artist to the 
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audience corresponds very strongly to Eliot’s own claims for an “exact equivalence,” a 
“complete adequacy of the external to the emotion.” In the case of Bradley we can also 
discern clear lines of thought which reverberate through Eliot’s work, both in his thesis and 
his literary theory. Bradley’s claims, that every idea produces a corresponding emotion, and 
that emotions are themselves indelibly linked to objects, are beliefs central to Eliot’s own 
“objective correlative.” Furthermore, these ideas are quoted by Eliot in his own PhD thesis, in 
agreement with Bradley, which strongly suggests that Eliot valued them and considered them 
worth reflecting on. Eliot goes so far as to write that “emotion is really part of the object,” a 
philosophical claim which forms the basis for his aesthetic theory in “Hamlet and His 
Problems.” Some years later, in his 1961 address “To Criticize the Critic” Eliot states that ‘I 
have written best about writers who have influenced my own poetry . . . I include F.H. 
Bradley, whose work – I might say whose personality as manifested in his works – affected 
me profoundly.”108  I believe we have license here to go beyond Eliot’s poetry, and to include 
his criticism in this claim. 
  What is evident is that, while there is no clear, direct source for Eliot’s term it emerged 
in the mind of someone who was attuned to and perceptive of the significant philosophical 
and aesthetic ideas of his time, and who drew from his considerable and varied intellectual 
experience in developing his literary criticism. He was aware of the ongoing conversation 
about the nature of objects and how we experience them, but his conception of the “objective 
correlative” owes more to the older idealist tradition, and Bergson’s aesthetic development of 
it, than to the fully phenomenological approach seen in Husserl and Heidegger. The term 
remains an important feature of early 20th century literary theory and its influence and 
                                                 
108 Eliot, To Criticize the Critic and Other Writings, 20. 
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importance, though diminished in terms of application, remain significant as an encapsulation 
of, in the words of Eliot, “the mind of my generation.”109         
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